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Abstract
Relatedness and synergy affect the selection pressure on cooperation and altruism. Although early
work investigated the effect of these factors independently of each other, recent efforts have been
aimed at exploring their interplay. Here, we contribute to this ongoing synthesis in two distinct but
complementary ways. First, we integrate models of n-player matrix games into the direct fitness
approach of inclusive fitness theory, hence providing a framework to consider synergistic social
interactions between relatives in family and spatially structured populations. Second, we illustrate
the usefulness of this framework by delineating three distinct types of helping traits (“whole-group”,
“nonexpresser-only” and “expresser-only”), which are characterized by different synergies of kind
(arising from differential fitness effects on individuals expressing or not expressing helping) and can
be subjected to different synergies of scale (arising from economies or diseconomies of scale). We
find that relatedness and synergies of kind and scale can interact to generate nontrivial evolutionary
dynamics, such as cases of bistable coexistence featuring both a stable equilibrium with a positive
level of helping and an unstable helping threshold. This broadens the qualitative effects of relatedness
(or spatial structure) on the evolution of helping.
Keywords. evolution of helping, relatedness, synergy, inclusive fitness, evolutionary games
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1 Introduction
Explaining the evolution of helping (cooperation and altruism) has been a main focus of research
in evolutionary biology over the last fifty years (e.g., Sachs et al., 2004; West et al., 2007). In this
context, Hamilton’s seminal papers established the importance of relatedness (genetic assortment between
individuals) by showing that an allele for helping can be favored by natural selection as long as −c+rb > 0
is satisfied, where c is the fitness cost to an average carrier from expressing the allele, b is the fitness benefit
to such a carrier stemming from a social partner expressing the allele, and r is the relatedness between
social partners (Hamilton, 1964a,b, 1970). Additional factors, including different forms of reciprocity
(i.e., conditional behaviors and responsiveness under multimove interactions, e.g., Trivers, 1971; Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981) and synergy (i.e., nonadditive effects of social behaviors on material payoffs, either
positive or negative, e.g., Queller, 1985; Sumpter, 2010), modify the fitness costs and benefits in Hamilton’s
rule (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Day and Taylor, 1997; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a; Gardner et al.,
2011; Van Cleve and Akc¸ay, 2014) and hence fundamentally influence the evolutionary dynamics of
helping.
Because of their ubiquity, relatedness and synergy occupy a central role among the factors affecting the
selection pressure on helping. Both are clearly present in the cooperative enterprises of most organisms.
First, real populations are characterized by limited gene flow at least until the stage of offspring dispersal
(Clobert et al., 2001), with the consequence that most social interactions necessarily occur between
relatives of varying degree. Second, social exchanges often feature at least one of two different forms of
synergy, which we call in this article “synergies of kind” and “synergies of scale”.
Synergies of kind (implicit in what Queller, 2011 calls “kind selection”) arise when the expression of
a social trait benefits recipients in different ways, depending on whether or not (or more generally, to
which extent) recipients express the social trait themselves. A classical example of a positive synergy
of kind is collective hunting (Packer and Ruttan, 1988), where the benefits of a successful hunt go to
cooperators (hunters) but not to defectors (solitary individuals). Examples of negative synergies of kind
are eusociality in Hymenoptera, by which sterile workers help queens to reproduce (Bourke and Franks,
1995), and self-destructive cooperation in bacteria, where expressers lyse while releasing virulence factors
that benefit nonexpressers (Fro¨hlich and Madeo, 2000; Ackermann et al., 2008).
Synergies of scale (Corning, 2002) result from economies or diseconomies of scale in the production
of a social good, so that the net effect of several individuals behaving socially can be more or less than
the sum of individual effects. For instance, enzyme production in microbial cooperation is likely to
be nonlinear, as in the cases of invertase hydrolyzing disaccharides into glucose in the budding yeast
Saccharomyces cerevisiae (Gore et al., 2009) or virulence factors triggering gut inflammation (and hence
removal of competitors) in the pathogen Salmonella typhimurium (Ackermann et al., 2008). In the former
case, the relationship between growth rate and glucose concentration in yeast has been reported to be
sublinear, i.e., invertase production has diminishing returns or negative synergies of scale (Gore et al.,
2009, fig. 3.c); in the latter case, the relationship between the level of expression of virulence factors and
inflammation intensity appears to be superlinear, i.e., it exhibits increasing returns or positive synergies
of scale (Ackermann et al., 2008, fig. 2.d).
Previous theoretical work has investigated the effects of relatedness and synergy on the evolution
of helping either independently of each other or by means of simplified models that neglect crucial
interactions between the two factors. For instance, the effects of demography on relatedness and the
scale of competition in family and spatially structured populations have often been explored under
the assumption of additive payoff effects (e.g., Taylor, 1992; Taylor and Irwin, 2000; Lehmann et al.,
2006; Gardner and West, 2006), while synergistic interactions have usually been investigated under the
assumption that individuals are unrelated (e.g., Motro, 1991; Leimar and Tuomi, 1998; Hauert et al.,
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2006). In the cases where relatedness and synergy have been considered to operate in conjunction, it
has been customary to model social interactions by means of a two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma, modified
by adding a synergy parameter D to the payoff of mutual cooperation (Grafen, 1979; Queller, 1984,
1985, 1992; Fletcher and Zwick, 2006; Lehmann and Keller, 2006a,b; Ohtsuki, 2010; Gardner et al., 2011;
Ohtsuki, 2012; Taylor and Maciejewski, 2012; Van Cleve and Akc¸ay, 2014). In this framework, D > 0
(positive synergy) implies positive frequency-dependent selection, while D < 0 (negative synergy) implies
negative frequency-dependent selection. The value of relatedness only matters in determining whether or
not positive synergy leads to bistability, resp., whether or not negative synergy leads to coexistence.
Although illuminating in some aspects, such two-player models cannot capture patterns of synergy
and resulting frequency dependence where positive (resp. negative) synergies of kind and negative
(resp. positive) synergies of scale do not combine additively. Such situations are however likely to be
common in nature. For example, collective hunting often features both positive synergies of kind and
negative synergies of scale (Packer and Ruttan, 1988), while the production of virulence factors in S.
typhimurium features both negative synergies of kind and positive synergies of scale (Ackermann et al.,
2008). Models of two-player matrix games between relatives miss these patterns of synergy (and possible
interactions between relatedness and synergy) because such games are linear, and only nonlinear games
(which necessarily involve at least three-party interactions) can accommodate both negative and positive
synergies without conflating them into a single parameter. Although previous work has explored instances
of n-player games between relatives (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Eshel and Motro, 1988; Archetti,
2009; Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013; Marshall, 2014) this has been done only for specific population or
payoff structures, and hence not in a comprehensive manner.
In this article, we study the interplay between relatedness and synergies of kind and scale in models
of n-player social interactions between relatives. In order to do so, we first present a general framework
that integrates n-player matrix games (e.g., Kurokawa and Ihara, 2009; Gokhale and Traulsen, 2010)
into the “direct fitness” approach (Taylor and Frank, 1996; Rousset, 2004) of social evolution theory.
This framework allows us to deliver a tractable expression for the selection gradient (or gain function)
determining the evolutionary dynamics, which differs from the corresponding expression for n-player
games between unrelated individuals only in that “inclusive gains from switching” rather than solely
“direct gains from switching” must be taken into account.
We then use the theoretical framework to investigate the interaction between relatedness, synergies of
kind, and synergies of scale in the evolution of helping. We show the importance of distinguishing between
three different kinds of helping traits (which we call “whole-group”, “nonexpresser-only” and “expresser-
only”), that are characterized by different types of synergies of kind (none for “whole-group”, negative
for “nonexpresser-only”, positive for “expresser-only”), and can be subjected to different synergies of
scale. Our analysis demonstrates that the interplay between relatedness and synergy can lead to patterns
of frequency dependence, evolutionary dynamics, and bifurcations that cannot arise when considering
synergistic interactions between unrelated individuals. Thereby, our approach illustrates how relatedness
and synergy combine nontrivially to affect the evolution of social behaviors.
2 Modeling framework
2.1 Population structure (demography)
We consider a homogeneous haploid population subdivided into a finite and constant number of groups,
each with a constant number N ≥ 1 of adult individuals (see table 1 for a list of symbols). The
following events occur cyclically and span a demographic time period. Each adult individual gives birth to
offspring and then survives with a constant probability, so that individuals can be semelparous (die after
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reproduction) or iteroparous (survive for a number of demographic time periods). After reproduction,
offspring dispersal occurs. Then, offspring in each group compete for breeding spots vacated by the death
of adults so that exactly N individuals reach adulthood in each group.
Dispersal between groups may follow a variety of schemes, including the island model of dispersal
(Wright, 1931; Taylor, 1992), isolation by distance (Male´cot, 1975; Rousset, 2004), hierarchical migration
(Sawyer and Felsenstein, 1983; Lehmann and Rousset, 2012), a model where groups split into daughter
groups and compete against each other (Gardner and West, 2006; Lehmann et al., 2006; Traulsen and
Nowak, 2006), and several variants of the haystack model (e.g., Matessi and Jayakar, 1976; Godfrey-Smith
and Kerr, 2009). We leave the exact details of the life history unspecified, but assume that they fall within
the scope of models of spatially homogeneous populations with constant population size (see Rousset,
2004, ch. 6).
2.2 Social interactions (games and payoffs)
Each demographic time period, individuals interact socially by participating in a game between n players.
Interactions can occur among all adults in a group (n = N), among a subset of such individuals (n < N)
or among offspring before dispersal (n > N). Individuals may either express a social behavior (e.g.,
cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma) or not (e.g., defect in a Prisoner’s Dilemma). We denote these two
possible actions by A (“cooperation”) and B (“defection”) and also refer to A-players as “expressers”
and to B-players as “nonexpressers”. The game is symmetric so that, from the point of view of a focal
individual, any two co-players playing the same action are exchangeable. We denote by ak the material
payoff to an A-player when k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 co-players choose A (and hence n− 1− k co-players choose
B). Likewise, we denote by bk the material payoff to a B-player when k co-players choose A.
We assume that individuals implement mixed strategies, i.e., they play A with probability z (and
hence play B with probability 1− z). The set of available strategies is then the interval z ∈ [0, 1]. At any
given time only two strategies are present in the population: residents who play A with probability z and
mutants who play A with probability z + δ. Let us denote by z• the strategy (either z or z + δ) of a focal
individual, and by z`(•) the strategy of the `-th co-player of such focal. The expected payoff pi to the
focal is then
pi
(
z•, z1(•), z2(•), ..., zn−1(•)
)
=
n−1∑
k=0
φk
(
z1(•), z2(•), . . . , zn−1(•)
)
[z•ak + (1− z•)bk] , (1)
where φk is the probability that exactly k co-players play action A. A first-order Taylor-series expansion
about the average strategy z◦ =
∑n−1
`=1 z`(•)/(n − 1) of co-players shows that, to first order in δ, the
probability φk is given by a binomial distribution with parameters n− 1 and z◦, i.e.,
φk
(
z1(•), z2(•), . . . , zn−1(•)
)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
zk◦ (1− z◦)n−1−k +O(δ2). (2)
Substituting (2) into (1) and discarding second and higher order terms, we obtain
pi (z•, z◦) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk◦ (1− z◦)n−1−k [z•ak + (1− z•)bk] (3)
for the payoff of a focal individual as a function of the focal’s strategy z• and the average strategy z◦ of
the focal’s co-players (see also Rousset, 2004, p. 95 and Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013, p. 85).
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2.3 Gain function and convergence stability
Consider a population of residents playing z in which a single mutant z + δ appears due to mutation,
and denote by ρ the fixation probability of the mutant. We take the phenotypic selection gradient
S = (dρ/dδ)δ=0 as a measure of evolutionary success of the mutant (Rousset and Billiard, 2000, p.
819; Van Cleve, 2014, p. 17); indeed, S > 0 entails that the mutant has a fixation probability greater
than neutral under weak selection (|δ|  1). In order to evaluate the fixation probability, we assume that
each demographic time period the material payoff to an individual determines its own fecundity (number
of offspring produced before competition) or that of its parent (if interactions occur among offspring) by
letting the average fecundity of an adult relative to a baseline be equal to the average payoff of a focal
actor (i.e., payoffs from the game have “fecundity effects” as opposed to “survival effects”, e.g., Taylor
and Irwin, 2000). With this and our demographic assumptions, S is proportional to the “gain function”
given by
G(z) = ∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z•
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z︸ ︷︷ ︸
“direct” effect, −C(z)
+κ
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z︸ ︷︷ ︸
“indirect” effect, B(z)
= −C(z) + κB(z) (4)
(see, e.g., Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013, eq. 7).
Equation (4) shows that the gain function G(z) is determined by three components. First, the “direct”
effect −C(z), that describes the change in average payoff of the focal resulting from the focal infinitesimally
changing its own strategy. Second, the “indirect” effect B(z), that describes the change in average payoff
of the focal resulting from the focal’s co-players changing their strategy infinitesimally. Third, the indirect
effect is weighted by the “scaled relatedness coefficient” κ, which is a measure of relatedness between the
focal individual and its neighbors, demographically scaled so as to capture the effects of local competition
on selection (Queller, 1994; Lehmann and Rousset, 2010; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012). We discuss these
three components of the gain function in more detail in the following section.
Knowledge of equation (4) is sufficient to characterize convergent stable strategies (Eshel and Motro,
1981; Eshel, 1983; Taylor, 1989; Christiansen, 1991; Geritz et al., 1998; Rousset, 2004). In our context,
candidate convergent stable strategies are either “singular points” (i.e., values z∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
G(z∗) = 0), or the two pure strategies z = 1 (always play A) and z = 0 (always play B). In particular, a
singular point z∗ is convergent stable if dG(z)/dz|z=z∗ < 0. Regarding the endpoints, z = 1 (resp. z = 0)
is convergent stable if G(1) > 0 (resp. G(0) < 0). In this article we focus on convergence stability, and
thus do not consider the possibility of disruptive selection, which can be ruled out by assuming that the
evolutionary dynamics proceeds strictly through a sequence of mutant invasions and fixation events (e.g.,
the “substitution process”; Gillespie, 1991; the “trait substitution process”; Metz et al., 1996; or the
“trait substitution sequence”; Champagnat et al., 2006).
2.4 Inclusive gains from switching
From equation (4), the condition for a mutant to be favored by selection can be written as −C(z)+κB(z) >
0. This can be understood as a scaled form of the marginal version of Hamilton’s rule (Lehmann and
Rousset, 2010) with C(z) corresponding to the marginal direct costs and B(z) to the marginal indirect
benefits of expressing an increased probability of playing action A. These marginal costs and benefits are
not measured in terms of actual fitness (number of adult offspring, which are the units of measurement
of b and c in Hamilton’s rule as given in the introduction, see e.g., Rousset, 2004, p. 113), but in
terms of fecundity via payoffs in a game. The scaled relatedness coefficient κ is also not equal to the
regression definition of relatedness present in the standard Hamilton’s rule, except for special cases where
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competition is completely global (Queller, 1994).
The coefficient κ is a function of demographic parameters such as migration rate, group size, and vital
rates of individuals or groups, but is independent of the evolving trait z (Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013).
For instance, in the island model with overlapping generations, κ = 2s(1−m)/(N [2−m(1−s)]+2(1−m)s),
where m is the migration rate and s is the probability of surviving to the next generation (Taylor and Irwin,
2000, eq. A10; Akc¸ay and Van Cleve, 2012, app. A2). In broad terms, we have (i) κ > 0 for population
structures characterized by positive assortment and relatively global competition, (ii) κ = 0 for infinitely
large panmictic populations or for viscous populations with local competition exactly compensating for
increased assortment of strategies (Taylor, 1992), and (iii) κ < 0 for population structures characterized
by negative assortment and/or very strong local competition (e.g., density-dependent competition occurs
before dispersal). Scaled relatedness coefficients have been evaluated for many life cycle conditions (see
table 1 of Lehmann and Rousset, 2010, table 1 of Van Cleve and Lehmann, 2013, and references therein;
see also app. A for values of κ under different variants of the haystack model).
In contrast to κ, which depends only on population structure, the other two components of the gain
function are solely determined by the payoff structure of the social interaction. In the following, we show
how −C(z) and B(z) can be expressed in terms of the payoffs ak and bk of the game. Doing so delivers
an expression for G(z) that can be analyzed with the same techniques applicable for games between
unrelated individuals. This expression provides the foundation for our subsequent analysis.
Imagine a focal individual playing B in a group where k of its co-players play A. Suppose that this
focal individual unilaterally switches its action to A while its co-players hold fixed their actions, thus
changing its payoff from bk to ak. As a consequence, the focal experiences a “direct gain from switching”
given by
dk = ak − bk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. (5)
At the same time, each of the focal’s co-players playing A experiences a change in payoff given by
∆ak−1 = ak − ak−1 and each of the focal’s co-players playing B experiences a change in payoff given by
∆bk = bk+1 − bk. Hence, taken as a block, the co-players of the focal experience a change in payoff given
by
ek = k∆ak−1 + (n− 1− k)∆bk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, (6)
where we let a−1 = bn+1 = 0 for mathematical convenience. From the perspective of the focal, this change
in payoffs represents an “indirect gain from switching” the focal obtains if co-players are related.
In appendix B, we show that the partial derivatives appearing in (4) can be expressed as expected
values of the direct and indirect gains from switching, so that the direct and indirect effects are respectively
given by
−C(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−kdk, (7)
and
B(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−kek. (8)
Hence, defining the “inclusive gains from switching” as
fk = dk + κek, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, (9)
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the gain function can be written as the expected value of the inclusive gains from switching:
G(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−kfk. (10)
An immediate consequence of equation (10) is that matrix games between relatives are mathematically
equivalent to “transformed” games between unrelated individuals, where “inclusive payoffs” take the
place of standard, or personal, payoffs. Indeed, consider a game in which a focal playing A (resp. B)
obtains payoffs
a′k = ak + κ [kak + (n− 1− k)bk+1] , k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 (11)
b′k = bk + κ [kak−1 + (n− 1− k)bk] , k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 (12)
when k of its co-players play A. Using equations (5)–(6) we can rewrite equation (9) as fk = a
′
k − b′k, so
that the inclusive gains from switching are identical to the direct gains from switching in a game with
payoff structure given by equations (11)–(12). The payoffs a′k (resp. b
′
k) can be understood as inclusive
payoffs consisting of the payoff obtained by a focal playing A (resp. B) plus κ times the sum of the
payoffs obtained by its co-players.
This observation has two relevant consequences. First, the results developed in Pen˜a et al. (2014) for
nonlinear n-player matrix games between unrelated individuals, which are based on the observation that
the right side of (10) is a polynomial in Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012), also apply here, provided that (i)
the inclusive gains from switching fk are used instead of the standard (direct) gains from switching dk
in the formula for the gain function, and (ii) the concept of evolutionary stability is read as meaning
convergence stability. For a large class of games, these results allow to identify convergence stable points
from a direct inspection of the sign pattern of the inclusive gains from switching fk. Second, we may
interpret the effect of relatedness on selection as inducing the payoff transformation ak → a′k, bk → b′k.
For n = 2, this payoff transformation is the one hinted at by Hamilton (1971) and later often discussed in
the theoretical literature (Grafen, 1979; Hines and Maynard Smith, 1979; Day and Taylor, 1998), namely(
a′0 a
′
1
b′0 b
′
1
)
=
(
a0 + κb1 (1 + κ)a1
(1 + κ)b0 b1 + κa0
)
,
where the payoff of the focal is augmented by adding κ times the payoff of the co-player.
3 Evolutionary dynamics of three kinds of helping traits
Throughout the following we assume that each A-player incurs a payoff cost γ > 0 in order for a social
good to be produced (e.g., harvested food, nest defense, or help directed to others). The benefits of the
social good are accrued by a subset of individuals in the group that we call “recipients”. Each recipient
obtains a benefit βj > 0 when there are j > 0 expressers in the group, and no benefit is produced if no
individual expresses the social trait (β0 = 0). The benefit is increasing in the number of expressers, that
is, the “incremental benefit” ∆βj = βj+1 − βj is positive (∆βj > 0).
Synergies of scale are characterized by the properties of the incremental benefits. In the absence of
synergies of scale, each additional expresser increases the benefit by the same amount so that ∆βj is
constant, implying that βj is linear in j. With negative synergies of scale, ∆βj is decreasing in j, whereas
positive synergies of scale arise when ∆βj is increasing in j. To illustrate the effects of synergies of scale
on the evolutionary dynamics of the social trait, we will consider the special case in which incremental
benefits are given by the geometric sequence ∆βj = βλ
j for some β > 0 and λ > 0, so that benefits are
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given by
βj = β
j−1∑
`=0
λ`. (13)
With geometric benefits, synergies of scale are absent when λ = 1, negative when λ < 1, and positive
when λ > 1.
We distinguish three kinds of social traits according to which individuals are recipients and thus
benefit from the expression of the social behavior: (i) “whole-group” (benefits accrue to all individuals
in the group, fig. 1.a), (ii) “nonexpresser-only” (benefits accrue only to nonexpressers, fig. 1.b), and
(iii) “expresser-only” (benefits accrue only to expressers, fig. 1.c). For whole-group traits there are no
synergies of kind: benefits accrue to all individuals irrespective of their kind, i.e., whether they are
expressers or nonexpressers. In contrast, nonexpresser-only traits feature negative synergies of kind,
whereas expresser-only traits feature positive synergies of kind. These differences are reflected in different
payoff structures for the corresponding n-player games, resulting in different direct, indirect, and inclusive
gains from switching (see table 2).
A classical example of a whole-group trait is the voluntary provision of public goods (Samuelson,
1954). In this case, the expressed social behavior consists in the production of a good available to others
and hence exploitable by nonproducing cheats (nonexpressers). Well-known instances of public-goods
cooperation are sentinel behavior in animals (Maynard Smith, 1965; Clutton-Brock et al., 1999), and the
secretion of extracellular products (Velicer, 2003; West et al., 2007), such as sucrose-digestive enzymes
(Greig and Travisano, 2004; Gore et al., 2009), in social bacteria.
The most prominent social behavior matching our definition of a nonexpresser-only trait is altruistic
self-sacrifice, which happens when individuals expressing the social behavior sacrifice themselves (or their
reproduction) to benefit nonexpressers (Frank, 2006; West et al., 2006). Sterile castes in eusocial insects
(Bourke and Franks, 1995), and bacteria lysing while releasing toxins (Fro¨hlich and Madeo, 2000) or
virulence factors (Ackermann et al., 2008) that benefit other bacteria provide some examples of altruistic
self-sacrifice in nature.
Expresser-only traits have been discussed under the rubrics of “synergistic” (Queller, 1984, 1985;
Leimar and Tuomi, 1998) and “greenbeard” (Guilford, 1985; Gardner and West, 2010; Queller, 2011)
effects, and conceptualized as involving “rowing”(Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry, 1995, p. 261-262) or
“stag hunt” (Skyrms, 2004) games. Often cited examples include collective hunting (Packer and Ruttan,
1988), foundresses cooperating in colony establishment (Bernasconi and Strassmann, 1999), aposematic
(warning) coloration (Queller, 1984, 1985; Guilford, 1988), and the Ti plasmid in the bacterial pathogen
Agrobacterium tumefaciens, which induces its plant host to produce opines, a food source that can be
exploited only by bacteria bearing the plasmid (Dawkins, 1999, p. 218, White and Winans, 2007). In
each of these examples, the social good accrues only to partners expressing the trait, either because of
a greater tendency to group and interact or because of the action of an emergent recognition system
discriminating expressers from nonexpressers.
For all three kinds of social traits, the indirect gains from switching are always nonnegative (ek ≥ 0 for
all k) and hence the indirect effect B(z) is nonnegative for all z. This implies that we deal with helping
traits at the level of payoffs and that increasing κ never leads to less selection for expressing the social
behavior. Due to their different ways of defining recipients, however, each social trait is characterized by
a social dilemma with structurally different payoff, direct gain, and indirect gains from switching. For
nonexpresser-only traits, the direct gains from switching are always negative (dk < 0 for all k) and thus
expressing the social behavior is also payoff altruistic (−C(z) < 0 and B(z) ≥ 0 for all z). For whole-group
and expresser-only traits, expressing the social behavior is not necessarily altruistic, depending on how
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the cost γ compares to benefits (βk+1, expresser-only traits) or incremental benefits (∆βk, whole-group
traits).
Before turning to the analysis, we note that a fourth class of social traits is sometimes also distinguished
in the literature, namely “other-only” traits where the benefits accrue to all other individuals in the
group, but not to the focal expresser itself (Pepper, 2000). Other-only traits, as whole-group traits, lack
synergies of kind, and hence the effects of relatedness on the evolutionary dynamics are qualitatively
similar for whole-group and other-only traits. We discuss this latter case in more detail in section 3.5 and
relegate the formal analysis, which is similar to the one for whole-group traits, to appendix D.
3.1 No synergies of scale
To isolate the effects of synergies of kind, we begin our analysis with the case in which synergies of scale
are absent, that is, benefits take the linear form βj = βj (λ = 1 in eq. (13)). The resulting expressions
for the inclusive gains from switching and the gain functions for the three different social traits are shown
in table 3. In each case, the gain function can be written as
G(z) = (n− 1) [−C + κB + (1 + κ)Dz] ,
where the parameter C > 0 may be thought of as the “effective cost” per co-player of expressing the
social trait when none of the co-players expresses the social trait. We have C = γ/(n− 1) when a focal
expresser is not among the recipients (nonexpresser-only traits) and C = (γ − β)/(n − 1) otherwise
(whole-group and expresser-only traits). The parameter B ≥ 0 measures the incremental benefit accruing
to each co-player of a focal expresser when none of the co-players expresses the social trait. We thus
have B = 0 for expresser-only traits and B = β otherwise. Finally, D measures synergies of kind and is
thus null for whole-group traits (D = 0), negative for nonexpresser-only traits (D = −β) and positive for
expresser-only traits (D = β).
In the absence of synergies of kind (D = 0, whole-group traits) selection is frequency independent and
defection dominates cooperation (z = 0 is the only convergence stable strategy) if −C + κB < 0 holds,
whereas cooperation dominates defection (z = 1 is the only convergence stable strategy) if −C + κB > 0
holds.
With negative synergies of kind (D < 0), there is negative frequency-dependent selection. Defection
dominates cooperation if −C + κB ≤ 0 holds, whereas cooperation dominates defection if −C + κB +
(1 + κ)D ≥ 0 holds. If −C + κB + (1 + κ)D < 0 < −C + κB holds, both z = 0 and z = 1 are unstable
and the singular point
z∗ =
C − κB
(1 + κ)D
(14)
is stable.
With positive synergies of kind (D > 0), there is positive frequency-dependent selection. Defection
dominates cooperation if −C + κB + (1 + κ)D ≤ 0 holds, whereas cooperation dominates defection if
−C + κB ≥ 0 holds. When −C + κB < 0 < −C + κB + (1 + κ)D, there is bistability: both z = 0 and
z = 1 are stable and z∗ is unstable.
This analysis reveals three important points. First, in the absence of synergies of scale the gain
function is linear in z, which allows for a straightforward analysis of the evolutionary dynamics for all three
kinds of social traits. Second, because of the linearity of the gain function, the evolutionary dynamics of
such games fall into one of the four classical dynamical regimes arising from 2× 2 games, namely (i) A
dominates B, (ii) B dominates A, (iii) coexistence, and (iv) bistability (see, e.g., Cressman, 2003, section
10
2.2). Third, which of these dynamical regimes arises is determined by the interaction of relatedness
with synergies of kind in a straightforward fashion. For all traits, defection dominates cooperation when
relatedness is low. For whole-group traits, high values of relatedness imply that cooperation dominates
defection. For nonexpresser-only and expresser-only traits, high relatedness also promotes cooperation,
leading to either the coexistence of expressers and nonexpressers (nonexpresser-only traits) or to bistability
(expresser-only traits).
3.2 Whole-group traits with synergies of scale
For whole-group traits there are no synergies of kind, but either positive or negative synergies of scale
may arise. How do such synergies of scale change the evolutionary dynamics of whole-group helping?
Substituting the inclusive gains from switching given in table 2 into equation (10) shows that the gain
function for whole-group traits is given by
G(z) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k {−γ + [1 + κ(n− 1)] ∆βk} . (15)
Since the incremental benefit satisfies ∆βk > 0 for all k, the gain function (15) is negative for κ ≤ −1/(n−1).
In this case, defection dominates cooperation and z = 0 is the only stable point. Hence, we consider the
case κ > −1/(n− 1) throughout the following.
If synergies of scale are negative (∆βk decreasing in k), the direct gains (dk) indirect gains (ek) and
inclusive gains (fk) from switching are all decreasing in k. This implies that −C(z), B(z) and G(z)
are all decreasing in z (cf. Pen˜a et al., 2014, remark 3). Similarly, if synergies of scale are positive
(∆βk increasing in k), dk, ek and fk are all increasing in k and hence −C(z), B(z) and G(z) are all
increasing in z. In both cases the evolutionary dynamics are easily characterized by applying the results
for public goods games with constant costs from Pen˜a et al. (2014, section 4.3): with negative synergies
of scale, defection dominates cooperation (so that z = 0 is the only convergent stable strategy) if
γ ≥ [1 + κ(n − 1)]∆β0, whereas cooperation dominates defection if γ ≤ [1 + κ(n − 1)]∆βn−1 holds. If
[1+κ(n−1)]∆βn−1 < γ < [1+κ(n−1)]∆β0 holds, there is coexistence: both z = 0 and z = 1 are unstable
and there is a unique stable interior point z∗. With positive synergies of scale, defection dominates
cooperation if γ ≥ [1 +κ(n− 1)]∆βn−1, whereas cooperation dominates defection if γ ≤ [1 +κ(n− 1)]∆β0.
If [1 +κ(n− 1)]∆β0 < γ < [1 +κ(n− 1)]∆βn−1 holds, there is bistability: both z = 0 and z = 1 are stable
and there is a unique, unstable interior point z∗ separating the basins of attraction of these two stable
strategies. These results resemble those for the cases in which there are no synergies of scale (section
3.1), but negative, resp. positive synergies of kind are present. In particular, it is again the case that the
evolutionary dynamics fall into one of the four classical dynamical regimes arising from 2× 2 games.
The effect of relatedness on the evolution of whole-group traits can be better grasped by noting that
multiplying and dividing (15) by 1 + κ(n− 1), we obtain
G(z) = [1 + κ(n− 1)]
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k (−γ˜ + ∆βk) , (16)
where γ˜ = γ/[1+κ(n−1)]. Equation (16) is (up to multiplication by a positive constant) equivalent to the
gain function of a public goods game between unrelated individuals with payoff cost γ˜ for producing the
public good, which has been analyzed under different assumptions on the shape of the benefit sequence
(Motro, 1991; Bach et al., 2006; Hauert et al., 2006; Pen˜a et al., 2014). Hence, relatedness can be
conceptualized as affecting only the cost of cooperation, while leaving synergies of scale and patterns of
frequency dependence unchanged.
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As a concrete example, consider the case of geometric benefits (13) with λ 6= 1 (see table 4 for a
summary of the results and app. C for a derivation). We find that there are two critical cost-to-benefit
ratios
ε = min
(
1 + κ(n− 1), λn−1[1 + κ(n− 1)]) and ϑ = max (1 + κ(n− 1), λn−1[1 + κ(n− 1)]) , (17)
such that for small costs (γ/β ≤ ε) cooperation dominates defection (z = 1 is the only stable point)
and for large costs (γ/β ≥ ϑ) defection dominates cooperation (z = 0 is the only stable point). For
intermediate costs (ε < γ/β < ϑ), there is a singular point given by
z∗ =
1
1− λ
[
1−
(
γ
β [1 + κ(n− 1)]
) 1
n−1
]
, (18)
such that the evolutionary dynamics are characterized by coexistence if synergies of scale are negative
(λ < 1) and by bistability if synergies of scale are positive (λ > 1). It is clear from equation (17) that, for
a given cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β, increasing relatedness makes larger (resp. smaller) the region in the
parameter space where cooperation (resp. defection) dominates. Moreover, and from equation (18), z∗ is
an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of κ when λ < 1 (resp. λ > 1), meaning that the proportion of
individuals cooperating at a stable interior point (resp. the size of the basin of attraction of the fully
cooperative equilibrium) increases as a function of κ (see fig. 2.a and 2.d).
3.3 Nonexpresser-only traits with synergies of scale
For nonexpresser-only traits, synergies of kind are negative. In the absence of synergies of scale, and
as discussed in section 3.1, this implies negative frequency dependence. To investigate how positive or
negative synergies of scale change this baseline scenario, we focus on the case in which relatedness is
nonnegative (κ ≥ 0).
From the formulas for dk and ek given in table 2, it is clear that, independently of any synergies of
scale, the direct gains from switching dk are decreasing in k. Hence, the direct effect −C(z) is negative
frequency-dependent. When synergies of scale are negative, the indirect gains from switching ek are
also decreasing in k, implying that the indirect effect B(z) is also negative frequency-dependent and
that the same is true for the gain function G(z) = −C(z) + κB(z). Hence, negative synergies of scale
lead to evolutionary dynamics that are qualitatively identical to those arising when synergies of scale
are absent: for low relatedness, defection dominates cooperation, and for sufficiently high relatedness, a
unique interior stable equilibrium appears (see app. E.1 and fig. 2.b).
When synergies of scale are positive, the indirect gains from switching ek may still be decreasing in k
because the incremental gain ∆βk accrues to a smaller number of recipients (n− 1− k) as k increases.
In such a scenario, always applicable when n = 2, the evolutionary dynamics are again qualitatively
identical to those arising when synergies of scale are absent. A different picture can emerge if n > 2 holds
and synergies of scale are not only positive, but also sufficiently strong. Then, the indirect gains from
switching may be unimodal (first increasing, then decreasing) in k, implying (Pen˜a et al., 2014) that
the indirect benefit B(z) is similarly unimodal, featuring positive frequency dependence for small z and
negative frequency dependence for large z. Depending on the value of relatedness, which modulates how
the frequency dependence of B(z) interacts with that of C(z), this can give rise to evolutionary dynamics
different from those possible without synergies of scale, discussed in section 3.1.
For a concrete example of such evolutionary dynamics, consider the case of geometric benefits (13)
with λ > 1 (see table 4 for a summary of results, app. E.2 for their derivation and fig. 2.e for an
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illustration). In this case, the evolutionary dynamics for κ ≥ 0 and n > 2 depend on the critical value
% =
1 + κ(n− 1)
κ(n− 2) , (19)
and on the two critical cost-to-benefit ratios
ζ = κ(n− 1), and η = 1
λ− 1
[
1 + λκ
(
(n− 2)λκ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
, (20)
which satisfy % > 1 and ζ < η.
With these definitions our results can be stated as follows. For λ ≤ % the dynamical outcome depends
on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to ζ. If γ/β ≥ ζ (high costs), defection dominates
cooperation, while if γ/β < ζ (low costs), there is coexistence. For λ > %, the dynamical outcome also
depends on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to η. If γ/β ≥ η (high costs), defection dominates
cooperation. If γ/β ≤ ζ (low costs), we have coexistence, with the stable singular point z∗ satisfying
z∗ > zˆ where
zˆ =
κ [(n− 2)λ− (n− 1)]− 1
[1 + κ(n− 1)](λ− 1) . (21)
In the remaining case (ζ < γ/β < η, intermediate costs) the dynamics are characterized by bistable
coexistence, with z = 0 stable, z = 1 unstable, and two singular points zL (unstable) and zR (stable)
satisfying 0 < zL < zˆ < zR < 1. Numerical values for zL (resp. zR) can be obtained by searching for
roots of G(z) in the interval (0, zˆ) (resp. (zˆ, 1)), as we illustrate in figure 2.e.
It is evident from the dependence of %, ζ, and η on κ that relatedness plays an important role in
determining the stable level(s) of expression of helping. As κ increases, the regions of the parameter
space where some non-zero level of expression of helping is stable expand at the expense of the region of
dominant non-expression. This is so because ζ and η are increasing functions of κ and % is a decreasing
function of κ. Moreover, inside these regions the stable non-zero probability of expressing helping increases
with κ (see fig. 2.b and 2.e). Three cases can be however distinguished as for the effects of increasing κ
when starting from a point in the parameter space where z = 0 is the only stable point. First, z = 0
can remain stable irrespective of the value of relatedness, which characterizes high cost-to-benefit ratios.
Second, the system can undergo a transcritical bifurcation as κ increases, destabilizing z = 0 and leading
to the appearance of a unique stable interior point (fig. 2.b). This happens when λ and γ/β are relatively
small. Third, there is a range of intermediate cost-to-benefit ratios such that, for sufficiently large values
of λ, the system undergoes a saddle-node bifurcation, whereby two singular points (zL, unstable, and zR,
stable) appear (fig. 2.e). In this latter case, positive synergies of scale are strong enough to interact with
negative synergies of kind and relatedness in a nontrivial way.
3.4 Expresser-only traits with synergies of scale
For expresser-only traits, and independently of any synergies of scale, the direct gains from switching dk
(cf. table 2) are increasing in k, implying that the direct effect −C(z) is positive frequency-dependent.
When synergies of scale are positive, the indirect gains from switching ek are also increasing in k, so
that the indirect effect B(z) is also positive frequency-dependent. Focusing on the case of nonnegative
relatedness (κ ≥ 0) this ensures that, just as when synergies of scale are absent, the gain function G(z)
is positive frequency-dependent. Hence, the evolutionary dynamics are qualitatively identical to those
arising from linear benefits: for low relatedness, defection dominates cooperation, and for high relatedness,
there is bistability, with the basins of attraction of the two pure equilibria z = 0 and z = 1 being separated
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by a unique interior unstable point (see app. F.1 and fig. 2.f ).
When synergies of scale are negative, the indirect gains from switching ek may still be increasing
in k because the incremental gain ∆βk accrues to a larger number of recipients as k increases. In such
a scenario, always applicable when n = 2, the evolutionary dynamics are again qualitatively identical
to those arising when synergies of scale are absent. A different picture can emerge if n > 2 holds and
synergies of scale are not only negative, but also sufficiently strong. In this case, B(z) can be negative
frequency-dependent for some z, and hence (for sufficiently high values of κ) also G(z). Similarly to the
case of nonexpresser-only traits with positive synergies of scale, this can give rise to patterns of frequency
dependence that go beyond the scope of helping without synergies of scale.
To illustrate this, consider the case of geometric benefits (13) with λ < 1, κ ≥ 0, and n > 2 (see table
4 for a summary of results, app. F.2 for proofs and fig. 2.c for an illustration). Defining the critical value
ξ =
κ(n− 2)
1 + κ(n− 1) , (22)
and the two critical cost-to-benefit ratios
ς =
1− λn
1− λ + κ(n− 1)λ
n−1, and τ =
1
1− λ
[
1 + λκ
(
(n− 2)κ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
, (23)
which satisfy ξ < 1 and ς < τ , our result can be stated as follows. For λ ≥ ξ the evolutionary dynamics
depends on how the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β compares to 1 and to ς. If γ/β ≤ 1 (low costs), cooperation
dominates defection, while if γ/β ≥ ς (high costs), defection dominates cooperation. If 1 < γ/β < ς
(intermediate costs), the dynamics are bistable. For λ < ξ, the classification of possible evolutionary
dynamics is as in the case λ ≥ ξ, except that, if ς < γ/β < τ , the dynamics are characterized by bistable
coexistence, with z = 0 stable, zL ∈ (0, zˆ) unstable, zR ∈ (zˆ, 1) stable, and z = 1 unstable, where
zˆ =
1 + κ
[1 + κ(n− 1)](1− λ) . (24)
For κ ≥ 0, the critical values ξ, ς, and τ are all increasing functions of κ. Hence, as relatedness κ
increases, the regions of the parameter space where some level of expression of helping is stable expand at
the expense of the region of dominant nonexpression. Moreover, inside these regions the stable positive
probability of expressing helping increases with κ (fig. 2.c). When synergies of scale are “sufficiently”
negative (λ < ξ) and for intermediate cost-to-benefit ratios (ς < γ/β < τ) relatedness and synergies
interact in a nontrivial way, leading to saddle-node bifurcations as κ increases (fig. 2.c).
3.5 Connections with previous models
Our model without synergies of scale, for which the G(z) is linear in z (section 3.1) extends classical
two-player matrix games between relatives (e.g. Grafen, 1979, Frank, 1998, ch. 5-6) to the more general
case of n-player linear games between relatives. Indeed, for n = 2, identifying scaled relatedness κ with
relatedness r, and up to normalization of the payoff matrices, equation (14) recovers Grafen (1979, eq. 9)
and Frank (1998, eq. 5.6). Interestingly, Frank (1998, p. 98) considers a two-player model of helping with
two pure strategies (“nesting” or expressing a queen phenotype, and “helping” or expressing a sterile
worker phenotype), which is a particular case of our model of nonexpresser-only traits.
Our results on whole-group traits with geometric returns (section 3.2 and app. C) extend the model
studied by Hauert et al. (2006, p. 198) from the particular case of interactions between unrelated
individuals (κ = 0) to the more general case of interactions between relatives (κ ∈ [−1, 1]) and recover
the result by Archetti (2009, p. 476) in the limit λ→ 0, in which the game is also called a “volunteer’s
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dilemma” (Diekmann, 1985). Although we restricted our attention to the cases of constant, decreasing,
and increasing incremental benefits, it is clear that equation (16) applies to benefits βj of any shape.
Hence, general results about the stability of equilibria in public goods games (Pen˜a et al., 2014) with
sigmoid benefits (Bach et al., 2006; Archetti and Scheuring, 2011) carry over to games between relatives.
For their model of “self-destructive cooperation” in bacteria, Ackermann et al. (2008) assumed a
nonexpresser-only trait with no synergies of scale, and a haystack model of population structure implying
κ = (No−N)/(No(N−1)), where n = No ≥ N is the number of offspring among which the game is played
(see eq. (A.4)). Identifying our γ and β with (respectively) their β with b, the main result of Ackermann
et al. (2008) (eq. 7 in their supplementary material) is recovered as a particular case of our result that
the unique convergent stable strategy for this case is given by z∗ = [κ(n − 1)β − γ]/[(1 + κ)(n − 1)β]
(eq. (14)). The fact that in this example κ is a probability of coalescence within groups shows that social
interactions effectively occur between family members, and hence that kin selection is crucial to the
understanding of self-destructive cooperation (Gardner and Ku¨mmerli, 2008).
As mentioned before, the analysis of other-only traits follows closely that of whole-group traits (see
app. D). The model of altruistic helping in Eshel and Motro (1988) considers such an other-only trait. In
their model, one individual in the group needs help, which can be provided (action A) or denied (action
B) by its n− 1 neighbors: a situation Eshel and Motro call the “three brothers’ problem” when n = 3.
Suppose that the cost for each helper is a constant ε > 0 independent on the number of expressers (Eshel
and Motro (1988)’s “risk for each volunteer”, denoted by c in their paper) and that the benefit for the
individual in need when k co-players offer help is given by vk (Eshel and Motro (1988)’s “gain function”,
denoted by bk in their paper). Then, if individuals need help at random, the payoffs for helping (A) and
not helping (B) are given by ak = −ε(n − 1)/n + vk/n and bk = vk/n. Defining γ = ε(n − 1)/n and
βk = vk/(n− 1), we have ak = −γ + βk and bk = βk. Comparing these with the payoffs for whole-group
traits in table 2, it is apparent that the key difference between other-only traits and whole-group traits
is that an expresser is not among the recipients of its own helping behavior. As we show in appendix
D, our results for whole-group traits carry over to such other-only traits. In particular, our results for
whole-group traits with geometric benefits can be used to recover results 1,2, and 3 of Eshel and Motro
(1988) and to extend them from family-structured to spatially-structured populations.
Finally, Van Cleve and Lehmann (2013) discuss an n-player coordination game. They assume payoffs
given by ak = 1 + S(R/S)
k/(n−1) and bk = 1 + P (T/P )k/(n−1), for positive R,S, T , and P , satisfying
R > T , P > S and P > T . It is easy to see that both the direct effect −C(z) and the indirect effect B(z)
are strictly increasing functions of z having exactly one sign change. This implies that, for κ ≥ 0, the
evolutionary dynamics are characterized by bistability, with the basins of attraction of the two equilibria
z = 0 and z = 1 being divided by the interior unstable equilibrium z∗. Importantly, and in contrast
to the social traits analyzed in this article, expressing the payoff dominant action A does not always
qualify as a helping trait, as B(z) is negative for some interval z ∈ [0, zˆ). As a result, increasing scaled
relatedness κ can have mixed effects on the location of z∗. Both of these predictions are well supported
by the numerical results reported by Van Cleve and Lehmann (2013), where increasing κ leads to a steady
increase in z∗ for R = 2, S = 0.5, P = 1.5, T = 0.25, and a steady decrease in z∗ for R = 2, S = 0.5,
P = 1.5, T = 1.25, see their figure 5. This illustrates that relatedness (and thus spatial structure) plays
an important role not only in the specific context of helping games but also in the more general context
of nonlinear multiplayer games.
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4 Discussion
We have shown that, when phenotypic differences are small, the selection gradient on a mixed strategy of
a symmetric two-strategy n-player matrix game is proportional to the average inclusive payoff gain to an
individual switching strategies, and that this can be written as a polynomial in Bernstein form (eq. (10)).
As a result, convergence stability of strategies in spatially structured populations can be determined from
the shape of the inclusive gain sequence (eq. (9)) and the mathematical properties of polynomials in
Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012; Pen˜a et al., 2014). We applied these results to the evolution of helping
under synergies of scale and kind, and unified and extended previous analysis. The most important
conclusion we reach is that, although an increase in (scaled) relatedness κ always tempers the social
dilemma faced by cooperative individuals in a helping game, how the social dilemma is relaxed crucially
depends on the synergies of kind and scale involved.
The simplest case is the one of whole-group traits (fig. 1a). Since there are no synergies of kind,
only synergies of scale can introduce frequency dependent selection. For κ ≥ 0, negative (resp. positive)
synergies of scale induce negative (resp. positive) frequency-dependent selection. Moreover, increasing
relatedness can transform a game in which defection is dominant (Prisoner’s Dilemma) into a game in
which cooperation and defection coexist (Snowdrift or anti-coordination game) when synergies of scale
are negative (fig. 2.a), or into a game in which both cooperation and defection are stable (Stag Hunt or
coordination game) when synergies of scale are positive (fig. 2.d).
More complex interactions between relatedness and frequency dependence can arise when there are
both synergies of kind and scale. For nonexpresser-only traits (fig. 1.b), synergies of kind are negative
and helping is altruistic, so that in the absence of relatedness defection dominates cooperation (as in
a Prisoner’s Dilemma). When synergies of scale are absent (linear benefits) or negative (diminishing
incremental benefits), both the direct and the indirect effect are decreasing in z and selection is negative
frequency-dependent. In this case, increasing relatedness might turn the game into a Snowdrift or an anti-
coordination game, where the probability of cooperating is an increasing function of relatedness (fig. 2.b).
Contrastingly, when synergies of scale are positive (increasing incremental benefits) the indirect effect may
become unimodal in z. This paves the way for new patterns of evolutionary dynamics and bifurcations.
For the particular case of geometric benefits, we find that there is a range of cost-to-benefit ratios
such that, for sufficiently strong positive synergies of scale, increasing relatedness induces a saddle-node
bifurcation whereby two internal equilibria appear, the leftmost unstable and the rightmost stable (fig.
2.e). After the bifurcation occurs, the evolutionary dynamics are characterized by bistable coexistence,
where the first stable equilibrium is pure defection (z = 0) and the second is a mixed equilibrium in which
individuals help with a positive probability (zR).
For expresser-only traits (where synergies of kind are positive, fig. 1c) a similar interaction between
relatedness and synergies occurs. When synergies of scale are absent or positive, G(z) is increasing in z
for κ ≥ 0. In this case, increasing relatedness might turn a scenario reminiscent of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
into a Stag Hunt or coordination game, where the size of the basin of attraction of the cooperative
equilibrium is an increasing function of relatedness (fig. 2.f ). Contrastingly, if synergies of scale are
negative, relatedness may interact nontrivially with synergies to produce a dynamical outcome which
is qualitatively identical to that arising from nonexpresser-only traits with positive synergies of scale,
namely, bistable coexistence (fig. 2.c).
The three kinds of helping traits we considered are also different in the conditions they impose on
the origin and the maintenance of helping. To see this, consider a payoff cost γ so large that the direct
sequence dk is negative. For the case of unrelated individuals (κ = 0) this implies that B dominates A
so that z = 0 is the only stable strategy. We ask what happens when κ is increased and focus on the
stability of the end-points z = 0 and z = 1.
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For whole-group traits, the indirect gains from switching when co-players are all defectors (e0) and
when co-players are all helpers (en−1) are both positive. This opens up the opportunity for both (i) z = 0
to be destabilized if κ > −d0/e0, and (ii) z = 1 to be stabilized if κ > −dn−1/en−1, which underlies the
classical effect that increasing relatedness can destabilize defection and stabilize helping.
In contrast, one of these two scenarios is missing for nonexpresser-only and expresser-only traits.
For nonexpresser-only traits, we have e0 > 0 and en−1 = 0 irrespectively of the shape of the benefit
sequence. Hence, although z = 0 can be destabilized by increasing κ (allowing for some level of helping
to be evolutionarily accessible from z = 0), z = 1 can never be stabilized and so full helping is never an
evolutionary (convergent) stable point. Exactly the opposite happens for expresser-only traits, where
en > 0 but e0 = 0. As a result, z = 1 can become stable (if κ > −dn−1/en−1) but z = 0 can never be
destabilized by increasing κ. This implies that, under our assumptions, an expresser-only trait with high
costs (γ > βn) can never evolve from a monomorphic population of nonexpressers (z = 0), and this for
any value of κ.
The kind of social trait also has a big impact on the amount of (scaled) relatedness required to make
stable some level of helping. This quantitative effect is illustrated in figure 2. When synergies of scale
are negative (λ = 0.7) and the cost-to benefit ratio is relatively low (γ/β = 3.5), for whole-group and
nonexpresser-only traits, moderate amounts of relatedness (κ ≈ 0.132 for whole-group traits, κ ≈ 0.185
for nonexpresser-only traits) are sufficient for a non-zero level of expression of helping to be stable (fig.
2.a and 2.b). In contrast, a comparatively large amount of relatedness (κ ≈ 0.699) is required for some
non-zero level of helping to be stable if the trait is expresser-only (fig. 2.c). In the case of positive
synergies of scale (λ = 1.25) and relatively high cost-to-benefit ratio (γ/β = 15), full expression of helping
is stable already with κ = 0 for whole-group and expresser-only traits (fig. 2.d and 2.f ). Contrastingly,
for nonexpresser-only traits, a positive probability of expressing helping is stable only for large values of
relatedness (κ > κ∗ ≈ 0.548, fig. 2.e).
We modeled social interactions by assuming that actions implemented by players are discrete. This
is in contrast to many kin-selection models of games between relatives, which assume a continuum of
pure actions in the form of continuous amounts of effort devoted to some social activity (e.g., Frank 1994;
Johnstone et al. 1999; Reuter and Keller 2001; Wenseleers et al. 2010). Such continuous-action models
have the advantage that the “fitness function” or “payoff function” (the counterpart to our eq. (3))
usually takes a simple form that facilitates mathematical analysis. On the other hand, there are situations
where individuals can express only a few behavioral alternatives or morphs, such as worker and queen in
the eusocial Hymenoptera (Wheeler, 1986), different behavioral tactics in foraging (e.g., “producers” and
“scroungers” in house sparrows Passer domesticus; Barnard and Sibly, 1981) and hunting (e.g., lionesses
positioned as “wings” and others positioned as “centres” in collective hunts; Stander, 1992), or distinct
phenotypic states (e.g., capsulated and non-capsulated cells in Pseudomonas fluorescens ; Beaumont et al.,
2009). These situations are more conveniently modeled by means of a discrete-action model like the one
presented here, but we expect that our qualitative results about the interaction between synergy and
relatedness carry over to continuous-action models.
Synergistic interactions are likely to be much more common in nature than additive interactions
where both synergies of scale and kind are absent. Given the local demographic structure of biological
populations, interactions between relatives are also likely to be the rule rather than the exception.
Empirical work should thus aim at measuring not only the genetic relatedness of interactants and the
fitness costs and benefits of particular actions, but also at identifying the occurrences of positive and
negative synergies of kind and scale, as it is the interaction between synergies and relatedness which
determines the qualitative outcomes of the evolutionary dynamics of helping (fig. 2).
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A The haystack model
Many models of social interactions have assumed different versions of the haystack model (e.g., Matessi
and Jayakar, 1976; Ackermann et al., 2008), where several rounds of unregulated reproduction can
occur within groups before a round of complete dispersal (Maynard Smith, 1964) so that competition is
effectively global. In these cases, as we will see below, κ takes the simpler interpretation of the coalescence
probability of the gene lineage of two interacting individuals in their group. Here, we calculate κ for
different variants of the haystack model.
The haystack model can be seen as a special case of the island model where dispersal is complete
and where dispersing progeny compete globally. In this context, the fecundity of an adult is the number
of its offspring reaching the stage of global density-dependent competition. The conception of offspring
may occur in a single or over multiple rounds of reproduction, so that a growth phase within patches
is possible. In this context, the number N of “adults” is better thought of as the number of founding
individuals (or lineages, or seeds) on a patch.
Two cases need to be distinguished when it comes to social interactions. First, the game can be played
between the adult individuals (founders) in which case
κ = 0, (A.1)
since relatedness is zero among founders on a patch and there is no local competition. Alternatively,
the game is played between offspring after reproduction and right before their dispersal. In this case
two individuals can be related since they can descend from the same founder. Since there is no local
competition, κ is directly the relatedness between two interacting offspring and is obtained as the
probability that the two ancestral lineages of two randomly sampled offspring coalesce in the same
founding individual (relatedness in the island model is defined as the cumulative coalescence probability
over several generations, see e.g., Rousset, 2004, but owing to complete dispersal gene lineages can only
coalesce in founders).
In order to evaluate κ for the second case, we assume that, after growth, exactly No offspring
are produced and that the game is played between them (n = No). Founding individuals, however,
may contribute a variable number of offspring. Let us denote by Oi the random number of offspring
descending from the “adult” individual i = 1, 2, ..., N on a representative patch after reproduction, i.e.,
Oi is the size of lineage i. Owing to our assumption that the total number of offspring is fixed, we have
No = O1 +O2 + ...+ON , where the Oi’s are exchangeable random variables (i.e., neutral process, δ = 0).
The coalescence probability κ can then be computed as the expectation of the ratio of the total number
of ways of sampling two offspring from the same founding parent to the total number of ways of sampling
two offspring:
κ = E
[
N∑
i=1
Oi(Oi − 1)
No(No − 1)
]
= N
(
σ2 + µ2 − µ
No(No − 1)
)
, (A.2)
where the second equality follows from exchangeability, µ = E [Oi] is the expected number of offspring
descending from any individual i, and σ2 = E
[
(Oi − µ)2
]
is the corresponding variance. Due to the
fact that the total number of offspring is fixed, we also necessarily have µ = No/N (i.e., No = E [No] =
E [O1 +O2 + ...+ON ] = Nµ), whereby
κ =
No −N
N(No − 1) +
σ2N
No(No − 1) , (A.3)
which holds for any neutral growth process.
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We now consider different cases:
(i) Suppose that there is no variation in offspring production between founding individuals, as in the
life cycle described by Ackermann et al. (2008). Then σ2 = 0, and equation (A.3) simplifies to
κ =
(No −N)
N(No − 1) . (A.4)
(ii) Suppose that each of the No offspring has an equal chance of descending from any founding
individual, so that each offspring is the result of a sampling event (with replacement) from a parent
among the N founding individuals. Then, the offspring number distribution is binomial with parameters
No and 1/N , whereby σ
2 = (1− 1/N)No/N . Substituting into equation (A.3) produces
κ =
1
N
. (A.5)
In more biological terms, this case results from a situation where individuals produce offspring according
to a Poisson process and where exactly No individuals are kept for interactions (i.e., the conditional
branching process of population genetics; Ewens, 2004).
(iii) Suppose that the offspring distribution follows a beta-binomial distribution, with number of trials
No and shape parameters α > 0 and β = α(N − 1). Then, µ = No/N and
σ2 =
No(N − 1)(αN +No)
N2(1 + αN)
,
which yields
κ =
1 + α
1 + αN
. (A.6)
In more biological terms, this reproductive scheme results from a situation where individuals produce
offspring according to a negative binomial distribution (larger variance than Poisson, which is recovered
when α→∞), and where exactly No individuals are kept for interactions.
B Gains from switching and the gain function
In the following we establish the expressions for C(z) and B(z) given in equations (7)–(8); equation (10)
is then immediate from the definition of fk (9) and the identity G(z) = −C(z) + κB(z).
Recalling the definitions of C(z) and B(z) from equation (4) as well as the definitions of dk and ek
from equations (5)–(6) we need to show
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z•
∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k [ak − bk] , (B.1)
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
=
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
zk(1− z)n−1−k [k∆ak−1 + (n− 1− k)∆bk] , (B.2)
where the function pi has been defined in equation (3). Equation (B.1) follows directly by taking the
partial derivative of pi with respect to z• and evaluating at z• = z◦ = z, so it remains to establish equation
(B.2).
Our derivation of equation (B.2) uses properties of polynomials in Bernstein form (Farouki, 2012).
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Such polynomials, which in general can be written as
∑m
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−kck, where x ∈ [0, 1], satisfy
d
dx
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−kck = m
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−k∆ck.
Applying this property to equation (3) and evaluating the resulting partial derivative at z• = z◦ = z,
yields
∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
= (n−1)z
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1−z)n−2−k∆ak+(n−1)(1−z)
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1−z)n−2−k∆bk.
(B.3)
In order to obtain equation (B.2) from equation (B.3) it then suffices to establish
x
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−k kck−1
m
(B.4)
and
(1− x)
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m∑
k=0
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−k (m− k)ck
m
, (B.5)
as applying these identities to the terms on the right side of equation (B.3) yields the right side of equation
(B.2).
Let us prove equation (B.4) (eq. (B.5) is proven in a similar way). Starting from the left side of
equation (B.4), we multiply and divide by m/(k + 1) and distribute x to obtain
x
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m−1∑
k=0
m
k + 1
(
m− 1
k
)
xk+1(1− x)m−(k+1)ck k + 1
m
.
Applying the identity
(
r
k
)
= rk
(
r−1
k−1
)
and changing the index of summation to k = k + 1, we get
x
m−1∑
k=0
(
m− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)m−1−kck =
m∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
xk(1− x)m−k kck−1
m
.
Finally, changing the lower index of the sum by noting that the summand is zero when k = 0 gives
equation (B.4).
C Whole-group traits with geometric benefits
With geometric benefits, we have ∆βk = βλ
k, so that the inclusive gains from switching for whole-group
traits are given by fk = −γ+[1 + κ(n− 1)]βλk. Using the formula for the probability generating function
of a binomial random variable, equation (10) can be written as
G(z) = −γ + [1 + κ(n− 1)]β (1− z + λz)n−1 . (C.1)
As G(z) is either decreasing (λ < 1) or increasing (λ > 1) in z, A (resp. B) is a dominant strategy if and
only if min [G(0),G(1)] ≥ 0 (resp. if and only if max [G(0),G(1)] ≤ 0). Using equation (C.1) to calculate
G(0) and G(1) then yields the critical cost-to-benefit ratios ε = min [G(0),G(1)] and ϑ = max [G(0),G(1)]
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given in equation (17). The value of z∗ given in equation (18) is obtained by solving G(z∗) = 0.
D Other-only traits
In contrast to what happens in whole-group traits, individuals expressing an other-only trait are au-
tomatically excluded from the consumption of the good they create, although they can still reap
the benefits of goods created by other expressers in their group. Payoffs for such other-only traits
are given by ak = −γ + βk and bk = βk, so that the inclusive gains from switching are given by
fk = −γ + κ [k∆βk−1 + (n− 1− k)∆βk]. For this payoff constellation, it is straightforward to obtain the
indirect benefits B(z) from equation (B.3) in appendix B. Observing that ∆ak = ∆bk = ∆βk holds for all
k, we have
B(z) = ∂pi(z•, z◦)
∂z◦
∣∣∣∣∣
z•=z◦=z
=
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1− z)n−2−k(n− 1)∆βk.
Using equation (7) and the equality ak− bk = −γ, we have that the direct benefit is given by −C(z) = −γ.
Substituting these expressions for C(z) and B(z) into equation (4), we obtain
G(z) =
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 2
k
)
zk(1− z)n−2−k [−γ + κ(n− 1)∆βk] . (D.1)
If κ ≤ 0, our assumption that the benefit sequence is increasing implies that G(z) is always negative,
so that z = 0 is the only stable point (defection dominates cooperation).
To analyze the case where κ > 0, it is convenient to observe that equation (D.1) is of a similar form
as equation (15). The only differences are that the summation in equation (D.1) extends from 0 to n− 2
(rather than n−1) and that the term multiplying the incremental benefit ∆βk is given by κ(n−1) (rather
than 1 + κ(n− 1)). All the results obtained for whole-group traits can thus be easily translated to the
case of other-only traits.
Specifically, we have the following characterization of the resulting evolutionary dynamics. In the
absence of synergies of scale, selection is frequency-independent with defection dominating cooperation
if κ < γ/[(n− 1)β] and cooperation dominating defection if κ > γ/[(n− 1)β]. With negative synergies
of scale, the gain function is decreasing in z (negative frequency dependence). Defection dominates
cooperation (so that z = 0 is the only convergent stable strategy) if γ ≥ κ(n−1)∆β0, whereas cooperation
dominates defection if γ ≤ κ(n− 1)∆βn−2 holds. If κ(n− 1)∆βn−2 < γ < κ(n− 1)∆β0 holds, the unique
convergent stable strategy z∗ features coexistence. With positive synergies of scale, the gain function is
increasing in z (positive frequency dependence). Defection dominates cooperation if γ ≥ κ(n− 1)∆βn−2,
whereas cooperation dominates defection if γ ≤ κ(n − 1)∆β0. If κ(n − 1)∆β0 < γ < κ(n − 1)∆βn−2,
there is bistability: both z = 0 and z = 1 are stable and there is a unique, unstable interior point z∗
separating the basins of attraction of these two stable strategies.
When benefits are geometric (13), the gain function is given by
G(z) = −γ + κ(n− 1)β(1− z + λz)n−2,
so that, for λ 6= 1, the evolutionary dynamics are similar to the case of whole-group traits after redefining
the critical cost-to-benefit ratios as
ε = min
(
κ(n− 1), λn−2κ(n− 1)) and ϑ = max (κ(n− 1), λn−2κ(n− 1))
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and letting
z∗ =
1
1− λ
[
1−
(
γ
βκ(n− 1)
) 1
n−2
]
.
E Nonexpresser-only traits
For nonexpresser-only traits, the inclusive gains from switching are given by
fk = −γ − βk + κ(n− 1− k)∆βk. (E.1)
E.1 Negative synergies of scale
When synergies of scale are negative, we have the following general result.
Result 1 (Nonexpresser-only traits with negative synergies of scale). Let fk be given by equation (E.1)
with β0 = 0, βk increasing and ∆βk decreasing in k and let κ ≥ 0 (the case κ < 0 is trivial). Then
1. If γ ≥ κ(n− 1)∆β0, z = 0 is the only stable point (B dominates A).
2. If γ < κ(n− 1)∆β0, both z = 0 and z = 1 are unstable and there is a unique internal stable point
z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (coexistence).
To prove this result, we start by observing that the assumptions in the statement imply that fk is
decreasing in k. In particular, we have fn−1 < f0. Consequently, if f0 ≤ 0 (which holds if and only
if γ ≥ κ(n − 1)∆β0) the inclusive gain sequence has no sign changes and its initial sign is negative.
Observing that fn−1 = −γ − βn−1 < 0 always holds true, the inequality f0 > 0 (which holds if and only
if γ < κ(n− 1)∆β0) implies that the decreasing sequence fk has one sign change and that its initial sign
is positive. Result 1 is then obtained by an application of Pen˜a et al. (2014, result 3).
E.2 Geometric benefits
For geometric benefits, we obtain the following result.
Result 2 (Nonexpresser-only traits with geometric benefits). Let fk be given by equation (E.1) with βk
given by equation (13) and let κ ≥ 0 and n > 2 (the cases κ < 0 or n = 2 are trivial). Moreover, let %, ζ
and η be defined by equations (19) and (20). Then
1. If λ ≤ %, G(z) is nonincreasing in z. Furthermore:
(a) If γ/β < ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are unstable and there is a unique internal stable point
z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (coexistence).
(b) If γ/β ≥ ζ, z = 0 is the only stable point (B dominates A).
2. If λ > %, G(z) is unimodal in z with mode given by zˆ = κ[(n−2)λ−(n−1)]−1[1+κ(n−1)](λ−1) . Furthermore:
(a) If γ/β ≤ ζ, both z = 0 and z = 1 are unstable and there is a unique internal stable point
z∗ > zˆ (coexistence).
(b) If ζ < γ/β < η, there are two interior singular points zL and zR satisfying zL < zˆ < zR. The
points z = 0 and zR are stable, whereas zL and z = 1 are unstable (bistable coexistence).
(c) If γ/β ≥ η, then z = 0 is the only stable point (B dominates A).
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Observing that % > 1 holds for κ ≥ 0 and that the case λ = 1 (no synergies of scale) is trivial, we can
prove this result by considering three cases: (i) λ < 1, (ii) 1 < λ ≤ %, and (iii) % < λ.
For λ < 1, we have negative synergies of scale and hence result 1 applies with ∆β0 = β. Recalling the
definition of ζ = κ(n− 1) from equation (20) and rearranging, this yields result 2.1 for the case λ ≤ 1 < %.
To obtain the result for the remaining two cases, we calculate the first and second forward differences
of the benefit sequence (13) and substitute them into
∆fk = −(1 + κ)∆βk + κ(n− 2− k)∆2βk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.
to obtain
∆fk = βλ
k {κ [(n− 2)λ− (n− 1)]− 1 + κ(1− λ)k} , k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.
For λ > 1, the sequence ∆fk is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover,
since ∆fn−2 = −βλn−2(1 + κ) < 0 always holds true, the sign pattern of ∆fk depends exclusively on
how ∆f0 = β {κ [(n− 2)λ− (n− 1)]− 1} compares to zero. Observe, too, that fn−1 < 0 always holds
true and that the sign of f0 is identical to the sign of ζ − γ/β.
Consider the case 1 < λ ≤ %. Recalling the definition of % (eq. (19)) we then have ∆f0 ≤ 0, implying
that ∆fk has no sign changes and that its initial sign is negative, i.e., fk is nonincreasing. Hence, if
f0 ≤ 0 (which holds if and only if γ/β ≥ ζ), the inclusive gain sequence has no sign changes and its
initial sign is negative. Otherwise, that is, if γ/β < ζ holds, we have f0 > 0 > fn−1 so that the inclusive
gain sequence has one sign change and its initial sign is positive. Result 2.1 then follows from Pen˜a et al.
(2014, result 3).
For λ > % we have ∆f0 > 0, implying that ∆fk has one sign change from + to −, i.e., fk is unimodal.
This implies that the gain function G(z) is also unimodal with its mode zˆ being determined by G′(zˆ) = 0
(Pen˜a et al., 2014, section 3.4.3). Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) is
closed form as
G(z) = −γ + β
λ− 1 + β
{
κ(n− 1)− 1
λ− 1 − [1 + κ(n− 1)] z
}
(1− z + λz)n−2
with corresponding derivative
G′(z) = (n− 1)β(λ− 1) (1− z + λz)n−3
{
κ(n− 2)− 1 + κ
λ− 1 − [1 + κ(n− 1)] z
}
.
Solving G′(zˆ) = 0 then yields zˆ as given in equation (21). The corresponding maximal value of the gain
function is
G(zˆ) = −γ + β
λ− 1
[
1 + κλ
(
(n− 2)κλ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
.
Result 2.2 follows from an application of Pen˜a et al. (2014, result 5) upon noticing that f0 ≥ 0 (precluding
the stability of z = 0 and ensuring G(zˆ) > 0) holds if and only if γ/β ≤ ζ and that G(zˆ) ≤ 0 (ensuring
that B dominates A) is satisfied if and only if γ/β ≥ η. (We note that the range of cost-to-benefit ratios
γ/β for which bistable coexistence occurs is nonempty, that is η > ζ holds. Otherwise there would exist
γ/β satisfying both γ/β ≤ ζ and γ/β ≥ η which in light of result 2.2.(a) and result 2.2.(c) is clearly
impossible.)
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F Expresser-only traits
For expresser-only traits, the inclusive gains from switching are given by
fk = −γ + βk+1 + κk∆βk. (F.1)
F.1 Positive synergies of scale
In the case of positive synergies of scale, we have the following general result.
Result 3 (Expresser-only traits with positive synergies of scale). Let fk be given by equation (F.1) with
βk and ∆βk increasing in k and let κ ≥ 0. Then
1. If γ ≤ β1, z = 1 is the only stable point (A dominates B).
2. If β1 < γ < βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1, both z = 0 and z = 1 are stable and there is a unique internal
unstable point z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (bistability).
3. If γ ≥ βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1, z = 0 is the only stable point (B dominates A).
The arguments used for deriving this result are analogous to those used for deriving the results for the
case of nonexpresser-only traits and negative synergies of scale (result 1 in app. E). The assumptions in
the statement of the result imply that fk is increasing in k. In particular, we have f0 < fn−1. The sign
pattern of the inclusive gain sequence thus depends on the values of its endpoints in the following way. If
f0 ≥ 0 (which holds if and only if γ ≤ β1), fk has no sign changes and a positive initial sign. If fn−1 ≤ 0
(which holds if and only if γ ≥ βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1), fk has no sign changes and a negative initial sign.
If f0 < 0 < fn−1 (which holds if and only if β1 < γ < βn + κ(n− 1)∆βn−1) fk has one sign change and a
negative initial sign. Result 3 follows from these observations upon applying Pen˜a et al. (2014, result 3).
F.2 Geometric benefits
For geometric benefits, we obtain the following result.
Result 4 (Expresser-only traits with geometric benefits). Let fk be given by equation (F.1) with βk given
by equation (13) and let κ ≥ 0 and n > 2 (the cases κ < 0 or n = 2 are trivial). Moreover, let ξ, ς and τ
be defined by equations (22) and (23). Then
1. If λ ≥ ξ, G(z) is nondecreasing in z. Furthermore
(a) If γ/β ≤ 1, z = 1 is the only stable point (A dominates B).
(b) If 1 < γ/β < ς, both z = 0 and z = 1 are stable and there is a unique internal unstable point
z∗ ∈ (0, 1) (bistability).
(c) If γ/β ≥ ς, z = 0 is the only stable point (B dominates A).
2. If λ < ξ, G(z) is unimodal in z, with mode given by zˆ = 1+κ[1+κ(n−1)](1−λ) . Furthermore
(a) If γ/β ≤ 1, z = 1 is the only stable point (A dominates B).
(b) If 1 < γ/β ≤ ς, both z = 0 and z = 1 are stable and there is a unique internal unstable point
z∗ ∈ (0, zˆ) (bistability).
(c) If ς < γ/β < τ , there are two interior singular points zL and zR satisfying zL < zˆ < zR. The
points z = 0 and zR are stable, whereas zL and z = 1 are unstable (bistable coexistence).
(d) If γ/β ≥ τ , z = 0 is the only stable point (B dominates A).
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The arguments used for deriving this result are analogous to those used for deriving the results for
nonexpresser-only traits with geometric benefits (result 2 in app. E). Observing that ξ < 1 holds and
ignoring the trivial case λ = 1, there are three cases to consider: (i) λ > 1, (ii) 1 > λ ≥ ξ, and (iii) ξ > λ.
For λ > 1 synergies of scale are positive and hence result 3 applies with β1 = β and βn+κ(n−1)∆βn−1 =
βς. This yields result 4.1 for the case λ > 1.
To obtain the results for the remaining two cases, we calculate the first and second forward differences
of the benefit sequence (13) and substitute them into
∆fk = ∆βk+1 + κ
{
(k + 1)∆2βk + ∆βk
}
, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2,
to obtain
∆fk = βλ
k [λ(1 + κ) + κ(λ− 1)k] , k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 2.
For λ < 1, the sequence ∆fk is decreasing in k and hence can have at most one sign change. Moreover,
as ∆f0 = βλ(1 + κ) > 0 always holds true, the initial sign of ∆fk is positive and whether or not the
sequence ∆fk has a sign change depends solely on how ∆fn−2 compares to zero. Observe, too, that for
λ < 1 we have ς > 1 as λn < λ holds.
Consider the case ξ ≤ λ < 1. By the definition of ξ (eq. (22)) this implies ∆fn−2 ≥ 0. In this case
∆fk has no sign changes and fk is nondecreasing. The sign pattern of the inclusive gain sequence can
then be determined by looking at how the signs of its endpoints depend on the cost-to-benefit ratio γ/β.
If γ/β ≤ 1, then f0 ≥ 0, implying that fk has no sign changes and its initial sign is positive. If γ/β ≥ ς,
then fn ≤ 0 and hence fk has no sign changes and its initial sign is negative. If 1 < γ/β < ς, then
f0 < 0 < fn, i.e., fk has one sign change and its initial sign is negative. Result 4.1 then follows from an
application of Pen˜a et al. (2014, result 3).
For λ < ξ we have ∆fn−2 < 0, implying that ∆fk has one sign change from + to −, i.e., fk is
unimodal. Hence, the gain function G(z) is also unimodal (Pen˜a et al., 2014, section 3.4.3) with mode zˆ
determined by G′(zˆ) = 0. Using the assumption of geometric benefits, we can express G(z) is closed form
as
G(z) = −γ + β
1− λ + βλ
{
[1 + κ(n− 1)] z − 1
1− λ
}
(1− z + λz)n−2,
with corresponding derivative
G′(z) = (n− 1)βλ {1 + κ− (1− λ) [1 + κ(n− 1)] z} (1− z + λz)n−3.
Solving G′(zˆ) = 0 then yields zˆ as given in equation (24). The corresponding maximal value of the gain
function is
G(zˆ) = −γ + β
1− λ
[
1 + λκ
(
(n− 2)κ
1 + κ(n− 1)
)n−2]
.
Result 4.2 then follows from applying Pen˜a et al. (2014, result 5). In particular, if γ/β ≤ 1, we also have
γ/β < ς, ensuring that f0 ≥ 0 and fn−1 > 0 hold (with unimodality then implying that the gain function
is positive throughout). If 1 < γ/β ≤ ς, we have f0 < 0 and fn−1 ≥ 0 (with unimodality then implying
G(zˆ) > 0). If ς < γ/β, we have f0 < 0 and fn−1 < 0. Upon noticing that G(zˆ) ≤ 0 is satisfied if and only
if γ/β ≥ τ holds, this yields the final two cases in result 4.2.
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Figure 1: Three kinds of social traits. Expressers (As) provide a social good at a personal cost,
nonexpressers (Bs) do not. The set of recipients (filled circles) of the social good depends on the particular
kind of social interaction. a, Whole-group traits. b, Nonexpresser-only traits. c, Expresser-only traits.
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Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams for whole-group (a, d), nonexpresser-only (b, e), and expresser-only (c,
f ) traits with geometric benefits. The scaled relatedness coefficient κ ≥ 0 serves as a control parameter.
Arrows indicate the direction of evolution for the probability of expressing helping. Solid lines stand for
stable equilibria; dashed lines for unstable equilibria. a, b, c, Negative synergies of scale (λ = 0.7) and low
cost-to-benefit ratio (γ/β = 3.5). d, e, f, Positive synergies of scale (λ = 1.25) and high cost-to-benefit
ratio (γ/β = 15). In all plots, n = 20.
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Symbol Definition
A first of two pure strategies (e.g., “help”)
ak payoff to an A-player matched with k A-players and n− 1− k B-players
B second of two pure strategies (e.g., “do not help”)
B payoff benefit parameter in games without synergies of scale
B(z) (fecundity) indirect effect
b fitness benefit of carrying a social allele
bk payoff to a B-player matched with k A-players and n− 1− k B-players
C payoff cost parameter in games without synergies of scale
c fitness cost of carrying a social allele
−C(z) (fecundity) direct effect
dk direct gain from switching to a focal matched with k A-players and n− 1− k B-players
D synergy parameter in games without synergies of scale
ek indirect gain from switching to a focal matched with k A-players and n− 1− k B-players
fk inclusive gain from switching to a focal matched with k A-players and n− 1− k B-players
G(z) gain function (= −C(z) + κB(z))
j total number of A-players in a group
k number of A co-players of a focal individual
N number of adult individuals in a group
n number of players (usually = N)
r relatedness coefficient
βj benefit from the social good when j individuals express helping (play A)
β parameter of the geometric benefits
z resident strategy (phenotype)
z• strategy (phenotype) of a focal individual
z`(•) strategy (phenotype) of the `-th co-player of the focal individual
z◦ average strategy (phenotype) of the neighbors of a focal individual
∆ first forward difference operator (∆ck = ck+1 − ck)
γ payoff cost of expressing helping
λ parameter of the geometric benefits
κ scaled relatedness coefficient
pi average payoff to a focal individual
Table 1: Symbols used in this article.
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Social trait ak bk dk ek fk
whole-group −γ + βk+1 βk −γ+∆βk (n−1)∆βk −γ+(1 + κ(n−1))∆βk
nonexpresser-only −γ βk −γ−βk (n−1−k)∆βk −γ−βk+κ(n−1−k)∆βk
expresser-only −γ + βk+1 0 −γ+βk+1 k∆βk −γ+βk+1+κk∆βk
Table 2: Payoff structures and gains from switching for three kinds of social traits. In each case expressers
(A-players) incur a cost γ > 0 and recipients obtain a benefit βj ≥ 0 which depends on the number of
expressers j they experience. The number of expressers experienced by a focal is j = k if the focal is
a nonexpresser, otherwise it is j = k + 1. Direct gains (dk) and indirect gains (ek) are calculated by
substituting the expressions for ak and bk into equations (5) and (6). Inclusive gains from switching (fk)
are then obtained from equation (9).
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Social trait fk G(z)
whole-group −γ+β+κ(n−1)β −γ+β+κ(n−1)β
nonexpresser-only −γ+κ(n−1)β−(1+κ)βk −γ+κ(n−1)β−(1+κ)β(n−1)z
expresser-only −γ+β+(1+κ)βk −γ+β+(1+κ)β(n−1)z
Table 3: Inclusive gains from switching (fk) and gain functions (G(z)) for the case of linear benefits (no
synergies of scale). The inclusive gains from switching are obtained by replacing βj = βj and ∆βj = β
into the corresponding expression from table 2. The gain function is then obtained from equation (10).
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whole-group
λ < 1 λ > 1
γ/β ≤ ε z = 1 γ/β ≤ ε z = 1
ε < γ/β < ϑ z∗ ∈ (0, 1) ε < γ/β < ϑ z = 0, z = 1
γ/β ≥ ϑ z = 0 γ/β ≥ ϑ z = 0
nonexpresser-only
λ ≤ % λ > %
γ/β < ζ z∗ ∈ (0, 1) γ/β < ζ z∗ ∈ (zˆ, 1)
γ/β ≥ ζ z = 0 ζ ≤ γ/β < η z = 0, zR ∈ (zˆ, 1)
γ/β ≥ η z = 0
expresser-only
λ < ξ λ ≥ ξ
γ/β ≤ 1 z = 1 γ/β ≤ 1 z = 1
1 < γ/β < ς z = 0, z = 1 1 < γ/β < ς z = 0, z = 1
ς ≤ γ/β < τ z = 0, zR ∈ (zˆ, 1) γ/β ≥ ς z = 0
γ/β ≥ τ z = 0
Table 4: Convergence stable strategies for the three kinds of social traits with geometric benefits. The
results hold for whole-group traits if κ > −1/(n− 1) and for nonexpresser-only and expresser-only traits
if κ ≥ 0. For whole-group traits, ε and ϑ are given by equation (17). For nonexpresser-only traits, %, ζ, η,
and zˆ are functions of κ, n, and λ (see eq. (19), (20), and (21)). For expresser-only traits, ξ, ς, τ , and zˆ
are functions of κ, n, and λ (see eq. (22), (23) and (24)).
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